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Abstract
Embodiment research has demonstrated that cognition is grounded in bodily interactions with the
environment and that abstract concepts are tied to the body’s sensory and motor systems. Building
upon this embodiment perspective and advancing our understanding, we discuss the extension of
embodied cultural cognition. We propose that some associations between bodily experiences and
abstract concepts are not randomly formed; rather, the development of such associations is situated
in a socio-cultural context, informed by cultural imperatives, values, and habits. We draw evi-
dence supporting this view of embodied cultural cognition in body–mind linkages manifested in
construal of emotions, time perception, person perception, social power, and moral reasoning. To
further extend this research avenue that synthesizes the studies of embodied cognition and culture,
we also suggest potential future research directions inspired by this view. This embodied cultural
cognition account is useful in understanding and organizing accumulating discoveries of cultural
variations in embodiments; it also highlights the social situatedness of embodied cognition and is,
therefore, highly compatible with theorizing and research in social and cultural psychology.
Thomas Hardy, a renowned English writer, once asked, ‘‘Why should a man’s mind have
been thrown into such close, sad, sensational, inexplicable relations with such a precarious
object as his body?’’ Setting aside its overly pessimistic implication, Hardy’s expression hints
that our mind is grounded in our body. All human beings are granted a body, through which
we operate on our environment. In so doing, the way our body acts upon the world will
over time instantiate and carry important psychological meanings, suggesting that body–
environment interactions can substantively shape our everyday sense-making. Indeed, some
commonly used metaphors often closely tie abstract sense-making to concrete bodily expe-
riences (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). For example, we describe an affectionate and kind
person as having a warm personality, and a transgressor as having dirty hands.
The emerging embodied cognition research investigates the grounding of mental pro-
cesses in body–environment interactions. This view offers a complementary account to
traditional amodal models of cognition (Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004; Lakoff &
Johnson, 1999), which focus on disembodied mind and explain cognitive processes in terms
of abstract mental representations (e.g., schema) independent from bodily activities. The
modal models of cognition, in contrast, focus on embodied mind and ground cognitive
processes in sensory and motor systems. Specifically, the embodied cognition perspective
views abstract representations as closely tied to the body’s sensorimotor experiences
(Barsalou, 2008; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005).
Esther Thelen, Schoner, Scheier, and Smith (2001) succinctly verbalized the essence of
embodied cognition:
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To say that cognition is embodied means that it arises from bodily interactions with the world.
From this point of view, cognition depends on the kinds of experiences that come from having
a body with particular perceptual and motor capacities that are inseparably linked and that
together form the matrix within which memory, emotion, language, and all other aspects of life
are meshed. (p. 1)
In delineating the meaning of embodiment, Lakoff and Johnson (1999) posit that an
embodied state comprises two structures: a physical structure pertaining to possessing a
corporeal body, and an experiential structure pertaining to the kinds of experience
people have by possessing the body (e.g., gesturing, walking, and smiling). Embodied
cognition builds upon the notion that the corresponding mental representations are
derived from one’s bodily experiences which is rendered possible by having a physical
body equipped with sensorimotor capabilities. For example, our body’s sensorimotor
modalities (physical structure) make it possible to experience high and low verticality
(experiential structure), which is then associated with the corresponding mental repre-
sentations of high and low power status (see Schubert, 2005). Making sense of the
mechanisms of embodied cognition, that is, the question of how abstract concepts
(e.g., power) become represented in one’s bodily states (e.g., high or low vertical
position), is an ongoing research endeavor. We begin this article with an overview of
two possible mechanisms underlying embodied cognition – embodied simulation and
conceptual metaphor – with illustrations from recent research that distinguish the two
perspectives.
Next, we discuss the possibility of extending the embodied cognition perspective to
studying embodied cultural cognition. We contend that it is important to situate the
study of embodied cognition in a socio-cultural context (see Schubert & Semin, 2009).
The notion of situated embodiment highlights the idea that the intimate link between
body and its associated mental representations is not random, but can be informed by cul-
tural norms, values, and habits in a given context (Gibson, 1979; Varela, Thompson, &
Rosch, 1991). In this light, we illustrate the potential of studying embodied cultural cog-
nition by reviewing empirical evidence of the role of culture in eliciting differing
embodiment effects in different cultural and linguistic groups. We relate our discussion of
embodied cultural cognition to the underlying mechanisms of embodied simulation and
conceptual metaphor. Also notably, implied in the embodied cognition perspective is the
possibility that both actual physical bodily states (hard embodiment) and the psychological
representation of these bodily states (soft embodiment) ground the processing of cognitive
and social stimuli. We discuss the distinction between soft and hard embodiments and
demonstrate with empirical examples why this distinction is relevant to the study of
embodied cultural cognition. Finally, we offer some possible future directions in the
research avenue of employing the embodied cognition approach to studying culture and
discuss its related limitations.
Understanding Embodied Cognition through Embodied Simulations and
Conceptual Metaphors
In a recent review, Landau, Meier, and Keefer (2010) advocated for the important dis-
tinction between embodied simulation and conceptual metaphor. Although these two
frameworks are both based on the notion that bodily states or recurring body–environ-
ment interactions are closely tied to sense-making of abstract concepts, the kinds of
bodily states they build on are essentially different.
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Embodied simulations
Theories of embodied cognition center on the idea of embodied simulation, which
involves modality-specific representations of bodily states such as sensations and motor
activities about a given concept that are acquired through direct experiences with that
concept (Barsalou, 2008; Landau et al., 2010). Two examples illustrate embodied simula-
tion. First, concepts about emotions contain modality-specific sensory representations that
accompany the expression of these emotions (Susskind et al., 2008). Specifically, it was
shown that the facial expression of fear augments sensory exposure, thereby allowing the
person to acquire more sensory inputs to enhance vigilance and attention toward poten-
tial threats. This sensory vigilance is simulated in individuals’ larger visual field, more
rapid eye movements, and an increased nasal inspiration. The facial expression of disgust,
in contrast, was found to diminish sensory exposure, thereby allowing the person to turn
down sensory inputs to reject further encoding of aversive stimuli. This sensory rejection
simulates an opposite pattern of physiological manifestations as those in reaction to fear
expression. Interestingly, a similar sensory regulatory effect was observed among those
who merely perceived (but did not express) these facial expressions (Vermeulen, Gode-
froid, & Mermillod, 2009). For perceivers, registering the concepts about emotions is suf-
ficient to give rise to sensory reactions that customarily occur during their prior
experiences of these emotions.
Second, in another recent study, Foroni and Semin (2009) found a reciprocal relation-
ship between cognitive processing of emotion stimuli and its specific recurring bodily
reactions. Their first study showed that upon reading smile-related action verbs (e.g., ‘to
laugh’), participants had their smiling muscle (the zygomatic major muscle), but not their
frowning muscle (the corrugators supercilii muscle), activated. In a follow-up study, par-
ticipants watched a series of cartoons after they were subliminally primed with emotion
verbs and adjectives. While judging how funny they thought the cartoons were, some of
them had to hold a pen with their lips (so they could not smile) and others were free to
move their mouth (so they could smile). Participants rated the cartoons as funnier if they
were subliminally primed with smiling (versus frowning) verbs only if they were free to
smile; this effect was not observed among those who were blocked from smiling.
Together, smile-related concepts activate the corresponding facial muscle, and more inter-
estingly, blocking the bodily experience of smile by controlling the facial muscle also
blocks the registration of smile-related concepts. This demonstrates an intricate feedback
loop between expressing a concept and its recurring simulations of body modalities.
Conceptual metaphors
The conceptual metaphor framework is a broader perspective that examines the use of
conceptual metaphors as a viable cognitive tool to help people understand abstract con-
cepts (target) with more concrete, albeit superficially dissimilar, concepts (source; Gibbs,
1994; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Landau et al., 2010). Conceptual metaphors are created
through entailing or mentally associating elements of the target concepts with the corre-
sponding elements of the source concepts (Landau et al., 2010).
Many, if not all, conceptual metaphors are intimately tied with specific bodily states or
bodily interactions with the world (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). For example, moral impu-
rity is often conceptually mapped onto physical contamination, as shown in common
metaphorical expressions that describe malevolent persons as having ‘dirty hands’ or ‘dirty
mouth’. In a recent study, Lee and Schwarz (2010) put these metaphors to the test (also
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see Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). They asked participants to either imagine giving their
coworker false information or true information by either leaving a voice mail or writing
an email. Next, in an ostensibly unrelated marketing study, these participants rated the
desirability of several products among which included mouthwash and hand sanitizer. As
predicted, ‘dirty mouth’ participants, who lied via a voice mail, evaluated mouthwash as
more desirable than did ‘dirty hands’ participants, who lied via an email. In contrast,
‘dirty hands’ participants evaluated hand sanitizer more positively than did ‘dirty mouth’
participants. Notably, participants who lied did not have physically dirty hands or mouth.
The embodiment effects, therefore, did not seem to have derived from modal simulations
of their specific bodily states (i.e., embodied simulations), but largely a result of concep-
tual mapping between unethical transgression (target concept) and physical contamination
(source concept).
A few studies also explored if the relatively abstract notions of person perceptions and
interpersonal relationships are conceptualized metaphorically in terms of more concrete
tactile sensation of warmth. For instance, research showed that holding a warm (versus
cold) beverage made participants more likely to perceive a person as having a ‘warmer’
personality (Williams & Bargh, 2008), to judge themselves as having a closer relationship
with their significant others, and to perceive the world in terms of relationships (IJzer-
man & Semin, 2009). In a related vein, recalling of or encountering an experimentally
induced episode of social exclusion led participants to estimate a lower room tempera-
ture and to desire for warm food and drinks than those who felt socially included
(Zhong & Leonardelli, 2008; see also IJzerman & Semin, 2010). These findings are
intriguing because they suggest that, on the one hand, physical warmth enhances the
grounded capacities to perceive socially desirable personality traits and to recognize social
relationships; on the other hand, the experience of social rejection regulates our sensory
thermometer to desire for physical warmth.
Distinguishing embodied simulations from conceptual metaphors
To summarize, both embodied simulations and conceptual metaphors build upon the
notion that abstract mental representations are closely tied to bodily states and bodily
interactions with the environment. However, referring to the above reviewed examples,
it is apparent that embodied simulations involve modality-specific bodily representations
that tend to be exclusively tied with prior experiences with a given concept, whereas
conceptual metaphors involve conceptually mapping relatively abstract target concepts
onto concrete bodily related source concepts. Essentially, these source concepts (e.g.,
hands are dirty) can exist in their own right without evoking the target concepts (e.g.,
telling lies via email). Accordingly, Landau et al. (2010) distinguished embodied simula-
tion as an intraconceptual mechanism and conceptual metaphor an interconceptual mecha-
nism. Broadly speaking, the two frameworks recognize the role of bodily experiences
in understanding complex concepts, but whether the bodily states and their associated
mental representations are linked intraconceptually or interconceptually introduces a
substantial distinction between the two.
An Extension: Embodied Cultural Cognition
An interesting question then follows: How is the mapping between bodily states and
mental representations developed? In our view, for some body–mind linkages, the map-
ping is derived from the meanings informed by the socio-cultural contexts, thus giving
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rise to the possibility of embodied cultural cognition. The study of embodied cultural cogni-
tion represents a conceptual leap from embodied cognition by recognizing the cultural
affordances that underlie the emergence of certain embodied phenomena (Cohen & Leung,
2009; Cohen, Leung, & IJzerman, 2009). It is possible that the embodiment of some
socio-cognitive phenomena in the form of bodily simulations and conceptual metaphors
is more prevalent in some cultures than others; it is also possible that the same socio-cog-
nitive phenomena are embodied in culturally specific bodily simulations and conceptual
metaphors. This perspective of embodied cultural cognition that acknowledges and theo-
rizes cultural variations in embodiment resonates with the proposition of situated embodi-
ment. In a recent special issue on embodied cognition, Schubert and Semin (2009) posit
that, by recognizing the situatedness of social cognition in the socio-cultural contexts, the
embodied cognition view can benefit psychological theories and research, particularly in
social psychology, through promising a unifying perspective. The theorizing that embod-
ied cognition is situated in a linguistic or cultural environment is made clear in Lakoff
and Johnson’s (1999) argument:
The mind is not merely embodied, but embodied in such a way that our conceptual systems
draw largely upon the commonalities of our bodies and of the environments we live in. The
result is that much of a person’s conceptual system is either universal or widespread across lan-
guages and cultures. (p. 6)
At first glance, Lakoff and Johnson (1999) construed embodiment as largely universal and
culturally and linguistically consistent. Their argument, however, does not go against the
view that the way our embodied mind is manifested might vary across languages and cul-
tures. While humans share a common physiological makeup, the environments in which
we carry our bodies to conduct everyday transactions could be very different. As Rohrer
(2007) put it:
The body of embodied cognitive science is not limited to physiological and neurophysiological
influences on mind, nor to that plus the physical body’s interactions with the physical world,
but also incorporates the experiences of the social and cultural body as well. In other words, it
has to take account of the socio-cultural context within which a particular body is situated. (p.
345)
Therefore, embodied cognition attests not merely to the link between our body and
mind, but also to the bodily experiences in a culture substantiated by meaningful impera-
tives, expectations, and norms (Gibson, 1979; Varela et al., 1991). In other words, the
body–mind linkage is informed or motivated by one’s cultural experiences in such a way
that ‘‘social constructions are given bodily basis and bodily motivation is given social-
cultural substance’’ (Ko¨vecses, 2000, 14).
In a commentary in response to Landau et al.’s (2010) metaphor-enriched approach,
IJzerman and Koole (2011) argued that Landau et al. may have placed too much emphasis
on conceptual metaphors as operating like top-down knowledge structures. They posit
that conceptual metaphors are in a way constrained from the bottom-up if we take into
consideration socio-cultural affordances. In this light, IJzerman and Koole (2011) intro-
duced the notion of cultural scaffolding to account for cultural variations in conceptual
metaphors. Scaffolding is a process through which humans learn about abstract concepts
by mapping them onto concrete, extant knowledge structures likely to have a physical
basis (e.g., temperature, size) that were acquired early in life (Williams, Huang, & Bargh,
2009). These concrete, contextualized concepts are then over time scaffolded onto more
abstract concepts (e.g., interpersonal relation, power perception). Cultural scaffolding,
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therefore, represents the kind of scaffolding that maps relatively abstract culture-related
knowledge onto concrete bodily related experiences.
Interestingly, this mapping between cultural knowledge and bodily states might not be
one-to-one, as Cohen and Leung (2009) noted:
Culture’s role is not simply one of encouraging certain body comportments that predispose us
to think and feel certain ways. Cultural schemas, rules, and scripts also guide the way a bodily
comportment leads to a particular mindset, among a number of different possible mindsets.
(p. 1281)
Therefore, the link between bodily states and what cognitive structures they embody is
underspecified. We will return to this point in the last section of this article.
In their article, IJzerman and Koole (2011) suggested two major sources for embodied
cultural cognition to emerge. First, cultural variations in embodiments emerge from the
differences in cultural norms and in the kind of social interactions habitually encountered
in a given culture. As such, these norms and experiences affect the basis on which bodily
states and mental structures are linked. Second, cultural variations in embodiments also
arise from relatively arbitrary set of cultural conventions, giving rise to the so-called totem
embodiments (Cohen & Leung, 2009). Totem embodiment builds upon a symbolic repre-
sentation of bodily states, with the symbolic meanings acquired through socializing forces
and perpetually reinforced within a cultural group. For example, the bodily expression
of extending the middle finger has no inherent meaning, but has been acquired the
learned association with hostility (Chandler & Schwarz, 2009) – a display of totem
embodiment. We illustrate embodied cultural cognition with empirical evidence in the
next section.
Research illustrations of embodied cultural cognition
We seek to review a growing body of research showcasing cultural variations in embodi-
ment. Although this review is meant not to be exhaustive, it offers a lens into the excit-
ing avenues of studying embodied cultural cognition.
Construal of emotion. It might be accurate to say that the identification of basic emo-
tions is perhaps one of the least debated evidence when it comes to attest to the univer-
sality of human psychology. Ekman, Friesen, and Ellsworth (1972) made the claim that,
‘‘every investigator had obtained evidence for six emotions (happiness, surprise, fear, sad-
ness, anger, and disgust combined with contempt)’’ after reviewing 30 years of emotion
research (Ekman, 1992, 550). And 15 years later, this evidence of universality was fur-
ther reaffirmed by Fridlund, Ekman, and Oster (1987). Research on emotions being
embodied occupies a center stage in the emerging vernacular of the embodied cognition
perspective since the phenomenal study by Strack, Martin, and Stepper (1988) who
found that participants rated some cartoons as funnier if they were holding a pen in
their teeth (thus producing a partial smile) as opposed to if they were holding a pen in
their lips (thus producing a partial frown). Although at that time the embodied cogni-
tion notion had yet to be emerged in psychologists’ common discourse, this study has
often been interpreted by later researchers as one of the classics illustrating the embodi-
ment of emotions.
In relation to the basic emotion of anger as an embodied emotion, Lakoff and Ko¨vecses
(1987) put it this way,
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if we look at the metaphors and metonymies for anger in the languages of the world, we will
not find any that contradict the physiological results that they [the Ekman research team] found.
(p. 220)
Particularly relevant to the conceptual metaphors of anger, in his in-depth investigation
of anger expressions in Tunisian Arabic, Maalej (2004) identified three kinds of embodi-
ment: physiological embodiment, culturally specific embodiment, and culturally tainted
embodiment.
In Maalej’s (2004) ethnographic work, he identified physiological embodiment of anger as
exemplifying the conceptual metaphor that entails the mapping between anger (target
concept) and the substance or fluid in a container (source concept) to highlight one’s
(metaphoric) physiological states during the anger experience, as in the expressions ‘I am
filled with anger’, ‘my heart is sloshing’, and ‘he left my blood to boil’ (the latter two
expressions were found in Tunisian Arabic). Although the emphasis is on the physiologi-
cal change to the body, we contend that Maalej’s notion of physiological embodiment
tends more toward the category of conceptual metaphor than that of embodied simula-
tion because ‘heart sloshing’ and ‘blood boiling’ are not the actual physiological simula-
tions when we (or the Tunisian Arab native) feel angry. This view that anger is
conceptually mapped onto the container metaphor was identified in diverse languages
including American, Chinese, Japanese, Hungarian, Polish, and Tahitian, giving this lay
anger-container metaphor a somewhat universal status cross-culturally or cross-linguisti-
cally (Ko¨vecses, 1995; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Ko¨vecses, 1987).
Of greater relevance to the embodied cultural cognition perspective is what Maalej
(2004) coined culturally specific and culturally tainted embodiments. Culturally specific
embodiment pertains to the kind of conceptual metaphors that entail a body part that is not
implicated in any related physiological change to the body. Examples of culturally specific
embodiment of anger found in Tunisian Arabic include ‘‘he broke my bones into small
bits ⁄ joints’’ and ‘‘he reduced my flesh into crumbs’’ (Maalej, 2004). These expressions
exemplify culturally specific embodiment because the described body parts are not physi-
ologically involved in anger (e.g., bones, flesh versus heart and blood in physiological
embodiment), but is culturally relevant. For example, the feast of sacrifice during the
Muslim pilgrimage visit to Saudi Arabia has the ritual of sacrificing a sheep, breaking its
bones into pieces, and cutting its flesh into crumbs. These bodily representations are then
experientially tied to the expression of anger largely understood in the Tunisian culture.
Culturally tainted embodiment has its origin in physiological embodiment but it is tainted
culturally by culture-specific items such as practices and habits and by cultural knowledge.
Examples of culturally tainted embodiment of anger observed in Tunisian Arabic include
‘‘I found him growling like a camel’’ and ‘‘he entered in a dust storm’’ (Maalej, 2004).
As part of the Tunisian cultural knowledge, camels are known for their anger and spite-
fulness, thus an anger experience is scaffolded onto this knowledge about camels. Also
interesting, dusty and violent desert storms are typical in the Arab region, thus the
description of an angry person entering in a dust storm with no self-control is scaffolded
onto this ecological knowledge.
Notably, Maalej (2004) argued that these distinctions are not mutually exclusive as, for
example, physiological embodiment can vary across cultures as a function of how each
culture metaphorically conceptualizes the bodily states experienced during anger, and cul-
turally tainted embodiment can be subsumed under physiological embodiment because it
is likely to be motivated by a bodily experience but is culturally specific. Together, this
ethnographic investigation of Tunisian Arabic anger expressions presents a good case that
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many conceptual metaphors (at least for anger) are culture bound. As Maalej (2004) put
it, embodiments that are culturally specific are significant as ‘‘it is [the] embodiment
where the body as a physiology and the body as a cultural dimension interact and even
merge’’ (p. 73).
Time perception. People often think and talk about time by mapping it onto a spatial
dimension. For example, English speakers predominantly use the front ⁄back orientation
to represent time, as in the expressions ‘the bad times are behind us’ and ‘we look forward
to meeting tomorrow’ (Lehrer, 1990; Traugott, 1978). A recent study examined this
time–space mapping through manipulating participants’ physical movements (Miles, Nind,
& Macrae, 2010). Consonant with the front ⁄ future and back ⁄past conceptual metaphors,
results showed that backward and forward physical movements tend to cue memories for
past events and thoughts about future events, respectively.
Interestingly, other than these front ⁄back horizontal spatiotemporal metaphors for time,
Mandarin speakers also use vertical spatiotemporal metaphors, with the up metaphor
denoting an earlier time and the down metaphor denoting a later time (Boroditsky, 2001).
Chinese and Americans’ susceptibility to think about time using horizontal and vertical
spatiotemporal metaphors was tested by Boroditsky (2001) in three experiments. After
being spatially primed by answering questions about two objects that were either hori-
zontally related (e.g., a picture depicted a black worm being ahead of a white worm) or
vertically related (e.g., a picture depicted a black ball being above a white ball), Manda-
rin- and English-speaking participants stated true or false to statements about time as fast
as they could (e.g., September comes before December). Mandarin speakers answered temporal
questions faster after vertical primes than after horizontal primes, and the reverse was true
for English speakers. This result was consistent with the predominance of vertical spatial
metaphors used by Mandarin speakers and predominance of horizontal spatial metaphors
used by English speakers. Further, the use of different spatiotemporal metaphors to talk
about time is largely learned, as it was found in follow-up studies that (i) Mandarin speak-
ers were more biased to think about time vertically if they started learning English later
in life, and (ii) after receiving a short training to think about time vertically, English
speakers, like Mandarin speakers, also responded to temporal questions faster after vertical
primes. Thus, the relatively abstract conceptions of time are mapped metaphorically onto
concrete spatial orientations, and the preponderance of such conceptual metaphors
appears to be largely shaped by language use.
Relatedly, Nu´n˜ez and Sweetser (2006) also investigated the spatial construals of time in
Aymara, an Amerindian language system. Aymara language presents an interesting case to
contrast the common metaphoric time–space correspondence of future to front and past
to back, because Aymara speakers have a different model of time wherein future is behind
ego and past is in front of ego (Nu´n˜ez & Sweetser, 2006). Aymara speakers’ disparate way to
construe time is believed to be based on their embodied experience possibly shaped by
their language: In Aymara language ‘eye’ and ‘front’ are represented by the same word, it
follows that past is in front because past is known (i.e., the speaker can see what is in
front) and future is at the back because future is unknown (Miracle & Yapita, 1981).
Together, both the Mandarin and Aymara conceptual metaphors for time offer good
examples of how the fundamental concept of time could be grounded in different spatial
bodily experiences largely shaped by language, an important cultural product.
Person perception. Growing research has shown that concepts as abstract as individuals’
perceptions of others and themselves and of social relationships can also be grounded in
598 Embodied Cultural Cognition
ª 2011 The Authors Social and Personality Psychology Compass 5/9 (2011): 591–608, 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2011.00373.x
Social and Personality Psychology Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
bodily experiences. For instance, social closeness has been found to be embodied in phys-
ical sensation of warmth: Holding a warm (versus cold) beverage was associated with per-
ceptions of closer relationships and an ambiguous target having a warm personality
(IJzerman & Semin, 2009; Williams & Bargh, 2008). In a related vein, recalling of or
encountering an experimentally induced episode of social exclusion led participants to
estimate a lower room temperature and to desire for warm food and drinks than those
who felt socially included (Zhong & Leonardelli, 2008).
Menon, Sim, Fu, Chiu, and Hong (2010) extended prior research on the metaphoric
representations of person perceptions to investigating cross-cultural variations in the prev-
alence of conceptual metaphors regarding different perceived positions of leaders relative
to a collective. Specifically, the conceptual metaphor of representing leadership as trail-
blazing entails an assertive, individually agentic, and approach oriented leader; the concep-
tual metaphor of representing leadership as trailing behind entails a protective, group-
focused, and protection-oriented leader (Menon et al., 2010). The researchers first
showed that (i) when participants were given a cartoon imagery depicting a school of fish
swimming, with one fish swimming ahead and another swimming behind, a higher per-
centage of Americans (versus Singaporeans) chose the front fish as leader, whereas a
higher percentage of Singaporeans (versus Americans) chose the back fish as leader; and
(ii) when participants were asked to freely draw their own images of leaders and follow-
ers, Americans represented more followers as facing the leader’s back than did Singaporeans,
but Singaporeans represented leaders as watching behind more followers than did Ameri-
cans. Probing into participants’ leader perceptions, it was found that Singaporeans per-
ceived back leaders as more group-focused and thereby more effective, although the two
cultures equally perceived front leaders as assertive and effective. Together, this research
presents an interesting case of cross-cultural variations in the prevalence of conceptual
metaphors that mentally map different leadership styles onto a front or back physical posi-
tion spatially. People are likely to learn about these conceptual metaphors in relation to
specific managerial settings that require leaders to either seize reward and opportunity
(thus leading from the front) or to be vigilant and protection oriented (thus leading from
the back).
The metaphoric conceptualizations of approach oriented leadership as trailblazing at the
front and protection-oriented leadership as trailing behind are based on nonarbitrary asso-
ciations. It is because a front position is largely conducive for exercising one’s own will
and seizing on opportunities as they present and a back position can well facilitate vigi-
lance and protection. Some embodied concepts, however, are grounded in arbitrary bod-
ily expressions [i.e., totem embodiments as Cohen and Leung (2009) called it].
Uncovering the relationships between arbitrary bodily expressions and their associated
mental concepts explicates that these relationships are clearly culturally learned (Chandler
& Schwarz, 2009), supporting the cultural specificity of embodied cognition.
A recent study by Chandler and Schwarz (2009) demonstrates one example of learned
movement – concept association or totem embodiment. They posit that ‘giving the mid-
dle finger’ and ‘thumbs up’ are arbitrary bodily expressions with a Western origin, with
the former bodily expression acquiring the culture-specific meaning of hostility and the
latter acquiring the meanings of approval and optimism. As expected, they found that
participants with their middle finger extended while reading about an ambiguously hostile
person rated the person as more hostile than those with their index finger extended.
Interestingly, the ‘thumbs up’ embodiment effect merged only among female participants,
with those having their thumb up while reading the ambiguously hostile person gave the
person a more favorable overall rating. We contend that this gender difference further
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attests to the cultural specificity of embodiment, as the researchers argued, women more
readily pick up the prosocial connotation of ‘thumbs up’ than men do in potentially
adverse interactions because they are more socialized into the cultural expectation to pur-
sue the ‘tend-and-befriend’ strategies to mitigate interpersonal threats. We discuss gender-
related (and religion-related) embodied cognition next.
Gender- and religion-related embodiments. Cultures do not only limit to national cultures
but also encompass the culture collectively shared by the people in a gender group or a
religion. As such, it is highly possible to find gender specific and religion-specific embod-
iments, with the two genders and different religious groups seeing the social reality differ-
ently after experiencing a certain bodily state infused with gender-related expectations or
religious imperatives.
Regarding gender-specific embodiment, the findings of gender variability in the
embodiment of power offer excellent illustrations. In two studies, Schubert and Koole
(2009) showed that men making a fist activated an empowered explicit and implicit self-
concept as exemplified in their perceived self as being more assertive and socially
esteemed. The effect among women appeared to be the reverse of men’s. Another series
of studies found that making a fist, an embodiment of powerful gesture for men and an
embodiment of powerless gesture for women, has substantial implication for bodily feed-
back (Schubert, 2004; see also IJzerman & Cohen, 2011). Specifically, for both genders,
making a gesture of bodily force (fist) activated power-related concepts in a Stroop task;
for men only however, making a fist was associated with higher hope for control in
hypothetical situations and the perception of an ambiguously acting male target as more
kind and less hostile. Women displayed the opposite patterns as men. The authors
explained this gender disparity in terms of cultural expectations and socialization of gen-
der roles, with men culturally expected to use bodily force to gain power and control
over others and women culturally expected to refrain from using bodily force unless it
becomes their last resort. Therefore, unlike men who tend to associate physical coercion
with having power, women tend to associate physical coercion with power loss, fear, and
diminished control (Schubert, 2004).
Like gender-related embodiments, it is conceivable to have embodiment effects specific
to a certain religious group. Highly relevant to religion-specific embodiment, Cohen and
Leung (2009) discussed a recent study that involved students who identified themselves as
a Muslim, Protestant, Hindus, or Jew. Participants were asked to unwittingly embody the
motion of hand washing, or more specifically, the act of removing physical contamina-
tion, through rubbing their hands as the study was disguised as one about hand tempera-
ture and hand–eye coordination. Assuming this hand washing gesture, participants gave
their moral instance on purity-related offenses having to do with committing physical
contamination acts (e.g., eating the pet hamster for dinner) or endorsing blasphemous or
other improper beliefs (e.g., fantasizing having sex with an inappropriate target).
As predicted, across different religious groups, embodying hand washing (versus not)
made participants judge acts of physical contamination more severely. More interestingly,
in judging blasphemous and improper beliefs, the embodiment effect only emerged
among Muslims and Protestants for their religion also placed great emphasis on proper
beliefs as well as deeds. In other words, as the four religious groups all emphasize good
deeds, they equally condemn contamination-related acts when embodying hand washing.
However, cultural differences in embodiment emerge in the condemnation of
blasphemous and improper beliefs because immoral beliefs are as mentally polluting as
immoral deeds for Muslims and Protestants, but not for Hindus and Jews. Embodying
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hand washing increases the likelihood that individuals see the world through the lens of
their religion, exemplifying more drastically the differences between religious ideals.
Embodied cultural cognition in a dynamic way. As the nature of embodiment is motivated
by cultural presuppositions and conventions, logically it follows that embodied cultural
cognition can be a dynamic process, with bicultural or multicultural individuals flexibly
switching their cultural frames of mind in response to their experiential embodied state
that bears substantial cultural meanings. A recent study by Leung and Cohen (2011a)
demonstrates this dynamic nature of embodied cultural cognition in moral reasoning.
In a recent commentary, Narvaez (2010) advocated that the embodied dynamism of
moral reasoning is imperative in a truly synthetic moral psychology theory (see also
Haidt, 2010). The bodily foundation of our moral reasoning comes about as ‘‘we think
in and through our bodies, making our reason primarily unconscious, metaphorical, and
imaginative’’ (Narvaez, 2010, 185). In one study, Leung and Cohen (2011a) examined
how the experiential embodied state affects how people reason as a moral being. Specifi-
cally, they compared the embodiments of particularistic and universalistic values among
Asian Americans with those of European Americans to empirically test the dynamic
embodiment of culturally important moral values. Particularistic morality is framed in
terms of an individual’s obligations and duties to related others, thus allowing social rela-
tionships to override rules at times; universalistic morality is framed in terms of an indi-
vidual’s strict compliance with abstract rules and laws and her belief that they are
universally applicable to everyone and in every situation (Trompenaars, 2003; Zurcher,
1968). All cultures are likely to house a moral ethic of particularism and a moral ethic of
universalism; however, one ethic might be more dominant than the other in a given cul-
ture. Past research suggests that particularism is the relatively more dominant moral dis-
course in East Asia and universalism the more dominant moral discourse in the United
States (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1997; Zurcher, 1968). If we consider bicultural
Asian Americans, who have extensive exposure to both Asian and American cultures, it is
reasonable to argue that they have access to both particularistic and universalistic moral
worldviews to a greater extent than monocultural European Americans and East Asians
do (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000).
In the study, a hugging posture was used to embody particularism and a rigid, straight
back posture was used to embody universalism. The researchers posit that to some peo-
ple, particularly East Asians, the hug is not simply a friendly socializing gesture, but a way
to express selfless and unconditional affection to close others. Given that both moral dis-
courses are held legitimate among bicultural Asian Americans, but only the universalistic
discourse is deemed legitimate among European Americans, it was hypothesized that
‘hugging’ (versus upright and control) Asian Americans, but not European Americans,
would assume a higher particularistic obligation to their close others; ‘upright’ (versus
hugging and control) Asian Americans and European Americans, however, would more
readily uphold the universalistic principle of honesty.
To test these hypotheses, participants were put into a corresponding posture (hug,
straight back, or sit as a control) intermittently while working on two counterbalanced
tasks: (i) a dilemma task described misdeeds committed by a friend or family member
which measured participants’ particularistic tendencies to cover for their close other’s
misdeeds, (ii) a memory task was set up that allowed participants to copy words from an
‘accidentally’ exposed word list which gauged how readily participants adhered to the
universalistic principle of honesty. As predicted, Asian Americans, given their dual access
to both moral codes, switched their moral frames in response to embodying a hug or a
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rectitude pose. Somewhat surprisingly, with universalism as the only legitimate moral
ethos in their culture, both the hug and the rectitude poses failed to produce corre-
sponding effects among European Americans. As the researchers reasoned, unlike their
Asian American counterparts, European Americans do not have dual moral frames to
switch in and out of, so embodying the moral pose did not cue the corresponding moral
code.
Embodying cultural cognition through soft embodiment. Thus far, we have presented embod-
ied cultural cognition as being derived mainly from the actual physical body interacting
with the world. On a similar vein, it is conceivable that embodied cognition can also be
derived from the psychological representation of the body interacting with the world (Leung
& Cohen, 2007; Zajonc & Markus, 1984). This psychological representation of bodily
experiences comes about as we form mental imagery of the way we conduct our bodies
(Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; McGlone & Harding, 1998).
A clever study demonstrated this soft embodiment effect. Boroditsky and Ramscar
(2002) examined how people’s abstract perception of time is built on their concrete bod-
ily experience. In their study, they found that people who had just imagined themselves
moving through space by sitting in an office chair on wheels were more likely to per-
ceive themselves as moving forward through time (versus time as passing them by) than
did those who had imagined using a rope to maneuver the chair to move toward them
(Study 1, 2002). The researchers posited that having people think about their spatial
motion, giving rise to a psychological representation of the body moving forward
through space as opposed to the body actually moving, can affect their perception about
time.
The mental models of the way our bodies move can instantiate an understanding of
our place in the physical world that is culturally meaningful and relevant (Cohen, Hoshi-
no-Browne, & Leung, 2007; Cohen & Leung, 2009). In a series of studies, Leung and
Cohen (2007) examined how cultural imperatives are softly embodied through adopting
a psychological perspective (a first- or third-person perspective) to mentally represent the
self in time and space (see also Libby & Eibach, 2002; Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Wu &
Keysar, 2007). To broadly characterize the differences in the cultural imperatives of dif-
ferent groups in an oversimplified way, the dominant cultural imperative in Western soci-
eties emphasizes paying attention to one’s own needs and feelings so as to find out what
one ‘truly’ wants, whereas the dominant cultural imperative in East Asian societies
emphasizes paying attention to how they look to other people so as to accommodate to
and harmonize with others (Kim & Cohen, 2010). In pursuit of these culturally meaning-
ful goals, Westerners tend to habitually adopt a first-person perspective, mentally model-
ing situations, particularly social ones, from an egocentric point of view; Easterners tend
to adopt a third-person perspective, mentally modeling situations from their close other’s
point of view (Morling, Kitayama, & Miyamoto, 2002; Wu & Keysar, 2007).
This patterned use of psychological perspective by people with East Asian or Ameri-
can cultural background is reflected in the use of deictic words (e.g., come, go) when
they mentally model or visualize their place in a social (versus nonsocial) situation. As
Black, Turner, and Bower (1979) noted, ‘come’ implies motion toward the position in
space that we are ‘occupying’ in our mental model, whereas go implies motion away
from the position we are ‘occupying’ in our mental model. Interestingly, Leung and
Cohen (2007) showed that European Americans tended to describe actions as coming
toward themselves but as going toward others (implying a first-person perspective) when
they visualized narratives or spontaneously constructed narratives. In contrast, Asian
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Americans were more likely to describe actions as going toward themselves but coming
toward others (implying a third-person perspective). Further, European Americans under-
stood motion metaphors through a sense of their own motion through time and space,
whereas Asian Americans did so through a sense of their friend’s motion. Together,
through assuming a first- or third-person point of view, people of American or East
Asian descent psychologically comport their body differently to map out a sense of
place, motion, and time in their mental models of everyday situations and events. Thus,
taking a certain perspective attests to a soft embodiment experience that is culturally
meaningful and encouraged.
What Is Needed to Further the Embodied Cognition Approach to Culture?
Building off the embodied cognition account to extend to the study of embodied cultural
cognition is an avenue that awaits much future research. We discuss a few issues inspired
by the review of research findings on cultural variability in embodiments, and we believe
that if these issues are addressed, this will bring the embodied cultural cognition approach
to the next level.
Embodied cultural cognition as reflected in conceptual metaphors (versus embodied simulations)
Notably, much of the research relevant to embodied cultural cognition that we reviewed
tends to reflect cultural variability in conceptual metaphors, not embodied simulations.
This could be attributed to two possibilities. First, human species have very similar bodies
and neurophysiological makeup the world over. Embodied simulations, building upon
the experiential correlations between mental representations about a given concept and
the modality-specific bodily states directly tied with the concept, might be characteristic
of people across cultures, given their highly similar organismic experiences. Second,
embodied simulations might be more likely to pertain to the kind of body–mind linkage
that is more basic and evolutionary prepared. Evolution might have predisposed humans,
and even other animal species, to such body–mind linkage that innately serves to enhance
physiological adaptations and thus these embodiments are relatively universal (i.e., pre-
wired embodiments; see Cohen & Leung, 2009; also see Fiske, 2004). Future research
can explore whether some instances of embodied simulations are reflections of embodied
cultural cognition.
The same bodily states can be cultural or not cultural
As mentioned in the earlier section, the link between bodily states and what cognitive
structures they embody is not one-to-one and therefore is underspecified. Take, for
example, the hand rubbing gesture in the study on religion-specific embodiment of purity
values discussed in Cohen and Leung (2009). In the context of the moral judgment task,
the hand rubbing gesture led different religious groups to embrace purity ideals. Put those
people in an examination hall and ask them to rub their hands while awaiting a difficult
math task, it is unlikely that this same hand rubbing gesture will conjure a stance of pur-
ity and sacredness; rather, the rubbing may embody intense nervousness in this anxiety-
arousing testing situation. Hand rubbing is neither inherently associated with the cultural
meaning of purity nor is it inherently associated with the physiological signal of nervous-
ness. These meaning associations, however, are not arbitrary either because hand rubbing
as in the act of hand washing can conceptually map well onto the target concept of moral
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cleanliness and that in the act of fidgeting can conceptually map well onto the target con-
cept of nervousness. Whether the same hand rubbing gesture entails the endorsement of
moral purity or the discharge of nervous energy might be largely dependent on the situa-
tion and individual characteristic. In this light, taking into account the interactions among
culture, person, and situation could further advance the understanding of embodied
cultural cognition.
The Culture · Person · Situation interaction account in embodied cultural cognition
We contend that the nature of mental structure given body is better understood by putt-
ing the body–mind linkages into perspective by jointly considering the norms and prac-
tices in a culture, an individual’s idiosyncratic profile, and situational press, which is
succinctly captured by the Culture · Person · Situation (CuPS) interaction approach
proposed by Leung and Cohen (2011b). The above reviewed empirical evidence on
embodied cultural cognition points toward the pertinent cultural norms and habitual
interactions encountered in a given culture as underlying the cultural variations in
embodiments. However, not all individuals in a culture are prototypical members of the
culture; they may buy into the pertinent norms and ideals in the culture or they may
reject it. In the CuPS framework, people are active agents within a cultural system, react-
ing toward or against the dominant cultural theme (Leung & Cohen, 2011b). Therefore,
while we are aware of the between-culture variations in the display of embodied cogni-
tion, we should also acknowledge within-culture variations by attending to atypical
cultural members or rejectionists.
Relatedly, what infuses embodied cultural cognition with a sense of dynamism is the
situational press. If we recall the study conducted by Leung and Cohen (2011a) on bicul-
tural Asian Americans who embodied particularism through a hug and universalism
through a rectitude pose, these bicultural individuals could switch their moral frames to
react to moral dilemmas differently when they were embodying one moral code or the
other. Therefore, individuals can embody a culturally relevant cognition dynamically,
with the situation calling upon a particular bodily state or the other that is meaningful in
the given situation.
Embodied cultural cognition as the socialization tool
Carrying forward cultural worldviews in the body implies that embodiment can make a
given culture’s instantiated values and assumptions relatively resistant to change. Those
cultural imperatives being embodied are able ‘‘to pass from practice to practice without
going through discourse or consciousness’’ and people have ‘‘no difficulty in grasping the
rationale … and in making it (their) own’’ (Bourdieu, 1977, 87–8). While the embodied
cultural values are less likely to be subject to reflection and challenge, they nonetheless
implicitly instantiate an approach to understanding the world, and because of this, they
may be all the more powerful.
One interesting question then follows: Whereas individuals can be relatively more con-
veniently socialized into a culture through imitating or observing others who physically
embody its values and assumptions (i.e., hard embodiment), individuals may not have
ready access into others’ mental models. It would be interesting to learn about how they
are socialized into a culture through psychologically embodying its imperatives and
assumptions (i.e., soft embodiment). Addressing these questions would be pivotal to
advance understanding on cultural learning and cultural change.
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Conclusion
In this article, we sought to build upon and extend the emerging vernacular of embodied
cognition to advance our understanding of embodied cultural cognition. We believe that
incorporating the embodiment perspective in the study of culture is a highly viable tool
to help shed new light to the study of socio-cultural phenomena, bridging and unifying
theorizing and research in different sub-disciplines in psychology. Being embedded or sit-
uated in a socio-cultural context, our body’s architecture has been engineered to help us
function effectively in this world. And our body interface (both actual and imagined) can
be culturally socialized to support us to make sense of the world, to smoothly navigate
everyday transactions, and to optimize our adaptive survival in the culture.
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